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 I  
 Peter Strawson famously wrote more than thirty years ago that “a philoso-
pher’s views on [perception] are a key to his theory of knowledge and to 
his metaphysics” (1979, 41). At that time, this statement probably would 
have been quite provocative inasmuch as it made perception sound more 
important than it was assumed to be. 
 Now, thirty years later, Strawson’s claim sounds too weak. A philoso-
pher’s views on perception are as important as her theory of knowledge or 
her metaphysics. Some may even be tempted to say that a philosopher’s 
views on epistemology or metaphysics are a key to her theory of percep-
tion. Perception is no longer seen as an inferior subfi eld of philosophy that 
may or may not help us to understand the philosophical questions that 
are supposedly more fundamental. Perception, at present, is as central a 
philosophical subfi eld as it gets. 
 This change is not only a merely quantitative one. It is true that more 
philosophers are working on perception and that their output is more 
sophisticated and nuanced than ever before, but this is not the whole 
story. What is more relevant, and more interesting from a philosophical 
point of view, is that the nature of the questions that are being asked 
about perception has also changed. 
 The aim of this volume is to give a representative sample of this new wave 
of philosophy of perception. And the aim of this introduction is to outline the 
questions contemporary philosophers of perception are concerned with and 
how they differ from the “old” philosophical questions about perception. 
 II  
 One salient fact about the questions contemporary philosophers of percep-
tion are concerned with is that they have intricate links to other subfi elds 
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of philosophy: epistemology, philosophy of language, metaphysics, aes-
thetics, even value theory. To put it somewhat provocatively, philosophy of 
perception no longer seems to be merely a subfi eld of philosophy of mind. 
Many of the chapters in this volume, for example, rely more heavily on the 
conceptual apparatus of other subfi elds of philosophy than that of general 
philosophy of mind. 
 Some of the most infl uential philosophical questions about perception 
are located fi rmly within philosophy of mind: What is the difference 
between perception and belief? What is the difference between percep-
tion and sensation? What is the relation between perception and action? 
When is perception successful? What is the difference between percep-
tion and mental imagery? What are the differences among the different 
sense modalities? Answering these questions has been possible, indeed 
desirable, within the boundaries of philosophy of mind. 
 These questions are, of course, still with us. But there are many more, 
ones that could not even be raised without relying on the conceptual ap-
paratus of subdisciplines other than philosophy of mind. Many of the 
questions the chapters of this volume ask are of this kind. 
 One such question is whether and in what sense perception is norma-
tive. Two of the chapters in this volume argue for the seemingly surprising 
claim that the concept of normativity plays a crucial role in understanding 
perception. Sean Kelly uses phenomenological considerations about shape 
and size constancy to argue that perception is essentially normative. 
Mohan Matthen’s starting point is also perceptual constancy, and he also 
pays attention to visual phenomenology, but his concern is mainly the 
question of how constancy can be explained with the help of the simple 
fact that different properties are attributed to different parts of the visual 
scene while preserving the normative character of perceptual content. 
The claim that there is something normative about perception is not new 
(see Koffka  1935 ; Gibson  1979 , 138–140; see especially the summary in 
Hatfi eld  1990 ), but it has largely been a neglected view in the last couple 
of decades. Kelly’s and Matthen’s chapters, taken in tandem, may put the 
concept of normativity back into mainstream philosophical analyses of 
perception. 
 Andy Egan argues for a version of projectivism, according to which at 
least some properties that we perceive objects as having are our projections. 
This general idea is a very old one that goes back at least to David Hume, 
but Egan’s way of arguing for a particular version of projectivism uses a 
general framework of self-locating/ de se propositions (Quine  1969 ; Lewis 
 1979 ; Chisholm  1982 ), which he fi rst used in the context of philosophy 
of language and epistemology (Egan  2006 ). Egan’s conclusion about the 
projectivist character of some of the properties we perceive objects as 
having shares a number of features with claims he makes elsewhere about 
seemingly distant philosophical subfi elds, such as aesthetics (Egan forth-
coming). Jonathan Cohen defends a somewhat similar claim, that colors 
are constituted in terms of relations between subjects and objects, and his 
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argument turns on a sophisticated metaphysical analysis of the nature of 
properties and dispositions (see also Cohen  2009 ). 
 Epistemology has always had special ties to philosophy of perception, 
traditionally because of the role perception is supposed to play in justifi -
cation. This link between perception and knowledge is at least partly due 
to the works of Fred Dretske over the decades (starting with Dretske 
 1969 ). Dretske’s contribution to this volume, however, turns the estab-
lished connection between perception and knowledge on its head. He is 
interested in what we perceive, and some of the considerations he uses in 
order to answer this question are about what we know (see also Dretske 
 2006 ,  2007 ). This turn demonstrates neatly the change of emphasis in 
recent philosophical studies of perception. Perception is no longer inter-
esting inasmuch as it can tell us something about knowledge (like the 
Strawson quote above seems to suggest). Quite the contrary: We can use 
epistemological considerations to answer intrinsically interesting ques-
tions about perception. 
 III  
 But why is it that, of all the subdisciplines of philosophy of mind, philos-
ophy of perception receives all this special attention? What makes per-
ception special? Three potential distinctive features come to mind. First, 
perception can be analyzed without talking about language or other high-
er cognitive apparatus, maybe even without talking about beliefs; hence, 
one possible strategy for understanding the mind would be to explain the 
relatively simple perceptual processes that human and nonhuman ani-
mals share and then move on to complex, exclusively human mental phe-
nomena, such as language or higher order beliefs (this strategy is not so 
new; see Quine  1974 ). Second, we have more empirical data on percep-
tion than on any other aspects of how the mind works. But the third 
potential distinctive feature seems to be the most infl uential: Perception 
is our window to the world—it is the mental faculty that puts us into 
direct contact with the world. Much of recent philosophy of perception 
aims to do justice to this special role that perception plays in our mental 
life. 
 And this brings us to a central, arguably the most central, question in 
contemporary philosophy of perception: whether, and in what sense, per-
ceptual states could be considered to be representations. Philosophers and 
psychologists often talk about perceptual states as representations. Tradi-
tionally, one of the most important problems in philosophy of perception 
has been to explain in what way perceptual states represent the world. 
 This seems to be a very natural framework to use if we want to talk 
about perception. Some of our mental states are representational. Most of 
our emotions are about something: We are afraid  of a lion, for example. 
The same goes for beliefs, desires, and imaginings. It seems natural, then, 
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to suppose that perceptual states are also representations: When you see 
a cat, your perceptual state is about this cat—it refers to this cat. To under-
stand perception is to understand in what way perception represents the 
world. 
 Note that this framework emphasizes the continuity between philoso-
phy of perception and other subdisciplines of philosophy of mind. There 
is a problem many (maybe even most) branches of philosophy of mind 
have in common: explaining how mental states represent the world. Phi-
losophy of perception is not an exception: Its concern is to explain how 
perceptual states represent the world. And many (indeed, most) classic 
debates in philosophy of perception emerge naturally if we accept this 
conceptual framework. Furthermore, many classic debates in philosophy 
of perception have presupposed this conceptual framework, as I try to 
demonstrate briefl y here. If we reject the assumption that perceptual 
states are representations, these debates will look very different. 
 Talking about perceptual representations has some important explana-
tory advantages. Two of the most important (and oldest) philosophical 
questions about perception have been (a) what is the difference between 
perception and sensation, and (b) what is the difference between percep-
tion and belief. According to the standard picture of perceptual process-
ing, mere sensation, that is, the stimulation of our sensory organs, at some 
point in the processing gives rise to perception, and perception then 
(sometimes) gives rise to beliefs. In order to know what perception is, we 
need to have a way of delineating it from sensation, on one hand, and 
belief, on the other. 
 If we think of perceptual states as representations, then there is a (rel-
atively) simple way of drawing these lines. Perception is representational, 
but sensation is (arguably) not. The stimulation of our sensory organs (of 
the retina, e.g.) does not have content: It does not represent anything 
(although it may be a reliable indicator, like the number of tree rings is a 
reliable indicator of the tree’s age). But our perceptual states represent 
the perceived object as having certain properties. So a clear division could 
be drawn between sensation, on the one hand, which does not have con-
tent, and perception and belief, on the other, which do. And as perception 
and belief supposedly represent the world differently, this representa-
tional difference between the two kinds of mental states may be used to 
draw the line between perception and belief. 
 There are a number of proposals about the differences between the 
way beliefs and perceptual states represent the world, and these proposals, 
taken together, cover a large proportion of the traditional longstanding 
debates of philosophy of perception. One popular suggestion is that while 
perception represents the world in a very fi ne-grained manner, beliefs do 
so in a rather coarse-grained fashion—an image is worth a thousand words, 
as they say. This suggestion was criticized because the content of beliefs 
can be very fi ne-grained, and the content of some of our perceptual states 
is very coarse-grained indeed (see Dennett  1996 ). 
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 Another interesting potential difference concerns the indexicality of 
these representations. Some of our beliefs have  indexical content , which 
means that the correctness of the belief depends on the context of the 
tokening of this belief. My belief that today is Sunday or that I am now in 
Vancouver has indexical content because the correctness of these beliefs 
depends on when (and where) I have these beliefs. Some other beliefs 
have nonindexical contents: The belief that Paris is the capital of France 
does not have indexical content; the correctness of this belief does not 
depend on when or where you have this belief or even who has this belief. 
Thus,  some but not all beliefs have indexical content. But one could argue 
that the content of perceptual states is always indexical. If you see a cat, 
you always see it as being in front of you or on your left or on your right—
as being localized in your egocentric space. If Bill is sitting across the room 
from you, he may also see the same cat, but if you see the cat as being on 
your right, he sees it as being on his left. Thus, although Bill and you see 
the same cat, the content of his perceptual state is different from that of 
yours. The content of one’s perceptual state, the argument goes, is  always 
indexed to the person who has this perceptual state (see Peacocke  1986 , 
 1989 ,  1992a ; see also Evans  1982 ; Noë  2004 ; Matthen  2005 on the con-
cept of egocentric space). 
 A third potential difference between perceptual content and belief 
content is that while the content of one’s beliefs is conceptual, that is, 
could not have the content it has if one did not master certain concepts, 
the same may not be true of perceptual states. You could not have a belief 
that Paris is the capital of France if you did not master the concept of 
capital. But, arguably, you could perceive a cat without mastering any 
concept at all, including that of cat. You may not see the cat as a cat 
(which may require some conceptual apparatus), but you see the cat 
nonetheless (see, e.g., in favor: Evans  1982 ; Crane  1992 ; Bermúdez  1995 , 
 2007 ; Peacocke  1992b ,  2001 ; Cussins  1993 ; Heck  2000 ; against: McDow-
ell  1994 ; Noë  2004 ; for a good summary, see Byrne  2005 ). 
 A fourth proposal is the following. The content of your belief that Paris 
is the capital of France is sensitive to the content of your other beliefs. 
In fact, you would not be able to have this belief unless you had some 
other beliefs, such as the one that Paris is a city. The same is not true of 
perceptual states. Our perceptual states can be very insensitive to our 
beliefs. We know that the two lines in the Müller-Lyer illusion fi gure are 
of the same length, but we can’t help perceiving them as having different 
lengths. 
 Finally, a potential difference between the contents of beliefs and of 
perceptual states is the nature of represented properties. Beliefs can rep-
resent their objects as having pretty much any property. Perceptual states, 
in contrast, represent their objects as having a limited set of properties, as 
having a certain shape, size, color, and spatial location. The list may be 
extended, but it is unlikely to encompass all properties. You do not per-
ceptually represent the object in front of you as a laptop made in 2006 in 
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Malaysia. The question, then, is which properties are represented in per-
ception and which ones are not (Siegel  2006 ). An important candidate for 
a perceptually represented property is the property of affording a certain 
action. It has been argued that we perceive objects as affording a certain 
action: We do not just infer that they do; we literally perceive this prop-
erty (Nanay forthcoming, see also Gibson  1966 ,  1979 ). 
 These various ways of differentiating between perceptual and nonper-
ceptual representations and their philosophical consequences cover most 
of the terrain of “traditional” philosophy of perception. In fact, most of 
the central debates of “traditional” philosophy of perception can be 
rephrased as debates about the nature of perceptual representation. But 
what happens if we question the assumption that perceptual states are 
representations? 
 Although considering perceptual states to be representations may be a 
natural way of describing our perceptual system, and this assumption 
dominated both the philosophical and the psychological research on per-
ception, some have recently questioned this entire framework. The pro-
posal is that perceptual states are not representations: Perception is a 
genuine relation between the perceiver and the perceived object (and not 
between the agent and some abstract entity called “perceptual content”). 
This recent antirepresentationalist view of perception is often called the 
“relational view of perception” (the terminology comes from Campbell 
 2002 ). 
 It is important to note that if we reject the representational view of 
perception, the classic debates of philosophy of perception does not go 
away. Many of these debates can be easily rephrased in nonrepresenta-
tional language (e.g., the question about what properties we perceive 
objects as having; see Siegel  2006 ). But some other debates seem more 
diffi cult to transplant into the relationalist framework. 
 The representational versus relational debate is one of the most impor-
tant and infl uential debates in philosophy of perception today (on the 
relational side, see Snowdon  1990 ; Martin  2004 ,  2006 , forthcoming;  Travis 
 2004 ; Brewer  2006 , forthcoming; Fish  2009 ; Hellie  2007 ; on the repre-
sentational side, see Chalmers  2004 ; Byrne  2001 ; Byrne and Logue  2008 ; 
Siegel  2010 ; Pautz forthcoming; Tye  2007 ; see also Crane  2006 for a good 
summary). Unsurprisingly, no less than four chapters in this volume aim 
to contribute to this debate, mainly by clarifying its dialectics. 
 Susanna Siegel’s chapter gives a clear account of the basic commit-
ments of the representational view and argues that, to genuinely depart 
from it, the relational view has to take on a radical and implausible form. 
Standard versions of the relational view, she argues, are hard-pressed to 
deny that experiences have contents. Adam Pautz gives a thorough analysis 
of various possible arguments in the representational–relational debate, 
for and against (see also Pautz forthcoming). He concludes that none of 
the alleged knockdown arguments are conclusive, but we have some 
(although maybe not fully decisive) reason to prefer the representational 
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alternative. Together, these two chapters form a very good introduction to 
debates concerning the status of perceptual states as representations. 
 Benj Hellie’s chapter does not argue for the relational view (he does so 
in Hellie  2007 ) but rather examines how we can analyze our inner expe-
riences if we reject representationalism. Mike Martin explores various 
ways of talking about how things look without endorsing the representa-
tional view. They both attempt to carve out a way of examining some of 
the old problems of philosophy of perception while discarding the suppo-
sition that perceptual states are representations. These two chapters indi-
cate an important possible direction for philosophy of perception: If we 
reject the idea that perceptual states are representations, this does not 
solve all the problems of perception, nor does it make them become 
 irrelevant. One big challenge for the antirepresentationalist camp is to 
create a conceptual apparatus for raising some of the old questions about 
perception while doing justice to the intuition that perception provides 
our direct contact with the world. Hellie’s and Martin’s chapters in this 
volume take some steps to this direction. 
 IV  
 So far, I have focused on how the questions philosophers ask about per-
ception have changed. But it is important to note that the way these 
questions are addressed has also changed considerably. An important fea-
ture of the new way of arguing about philosophical questions concerning 
perception is that paying close attention to empirical fi ndings about per-
ception seems to be the norm, rather than the exception. 
 What this means is not that philosophy of perception has became the-
oretical vision science. Rather, the philosophical arguments about percep-
tion are constrained by, and sometimes supported by, empirical evidence. 
Even in the case of some of the most genuinely philosophical debates, 
such as the representationalism versus relationalism debate, many of the 
arguments use empirical fi ndings as premises. 
 The empirical fi ndings used by the authors of this volume are very 
diverse. Jérôme Dokic uses mainly cognitive neuropsychological evidence 
about patients with Capgras’s and Fregoli’s syndromes in his treatment 
of the questions of whether and in what sense the recognition of people 
is perceptual and in his argument for his positive claim that the recogni-
tion of people involves a nonsensory component: the feeling of presence. 
Jesse Prinz, in contrast, uses pretty much all subfi elds of psychology and 
neuroscience to decide the age-old question about what makes percep-
tion conscious. His answer is: attention. One important feature of Prinz’s 
contribution is that, based on neuroimaging and behavioral evidence, he 
sketches an empirically plausible philosophical account of attention. 
Given that the concept of attention seems to play an increasingly impor-
tant role in philosophy of perception, Prinz’s theory provides a valuable 
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contribution to the growing body of research on the relation between 
attention and consciousness (see also Huang and Pashler  2007 ; Koch and 
Tsuchiya  2007 ; Nanay  2010 ; Mole forthcoming; Prinz forthcoming). 
 It is not at all surprising that philosophy of perception is the fi eld where 
empirical considerations are used most widely in philosophical arguments. 
Vision science is in many ways the most advanced branch of cognitive 
science, and as a result, it seems easier to bring empirical considerations 
into philosophical arguments about perception than into arguments about 
beliefs or desires. Yet, the willingness to engage with the empirical litera-
ture and to learn from it is an important change in the ways philosophical 
arguments about perception are being treated, and we can only hope that 
the rest of philosophy of mind will follow suit sooner or later. 
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